Power of Council of Non-Charter City to Amend or Repeal Initiated Ordinances by Tritschler, James R.
56 LAW JOURNAL-DECEMBER, 1935
case distinguishes this case on the basis that in the Jacobs case the em-
ployee was not warned. This does not seem to be a valid distinction,
since liability where the owner is under a non-delegable duty is not
based upon the fact that the owner warned or did not warn an employee
but is based upon the contractor's negligence. Such negligence is ad-
mitted in the principal case.
It is probable that by weight of authority and by logic, the owner
should be liable to the employee of an independent contractor where
there is inherent danger. The employee is in no contractual relation
with the owner, Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., supra,
and at the same time is the one most likely to suffer injury. The con-
trary doctrine is based on the theory that such recovery would save the
independent contractor from the consequences of his own negligence.
Salmon v. Kansas City, supra. But this overlooks the reason behind the
doctrine of non-delegable duty where work is inherently dangerous.
The owner is held liable in order to make him hire responsible contrac-
tors for such dangerous undertakings. See note in 23 A.L.R. 1129
(1921). That the independent contractor is also liable for his negli-
gence under such circumstances see Warden v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co.,
123 Ohio St. 304, 175 N.E. 207 (1931).
It is thus concluded that while the majority in the principal case
reached the correct result in cases dealing with electricity they used the
wrong theory and, it would seem, incorrectly stated that an owner under
a non-delegable duty is not liable to an employee of his independent
contractor.
JUSTIN H. FOLKERTH.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
POWER OF COUNCIL OF NON-CHARTER CITY TO AMEND OR
REPEAL INITIATED ORDINANCES.
By virtue of an initiated ordinance adopted at the election on No-
vember 2, 1926, the people of Steubenville, Ohio, enacted legislation in
regard to the municipal fire department. The provisions of the ordinance
determined the number of the personnel of the department and also
fixed the salaries and compensation of the officers and members thereof.
Subsequently, the city council of Steubenville, which is a non-charter
municipality, enacted several ordinances materially affecting the wages
of the firemen and also the number of the members of the department.
The relators, members of the department, whose salaries had been re-
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duced by this legislation, brought an action in mandamus to compel the
respondent as city auditor to issue warrants to the treasurer of the city
for the payment of the unpaid compensation. The relators contended
that such compensation was due them under the terms of the initiated
ordinance which had been adopted by the electorate on November 2,
1926. The Court of Appeals of Jefferson County refused the writ of
mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals, holding that in the absence of provisions in the constitution or
state law, limiting or controlling its power, a city council of a non-charter
city has the power to amend or repeal an initiated ordinance theretofore
adopted by the electors of such city. State ex rel Singer, et al. v. Cart-
ledge, City uditor, 129 Ohio St. 279, 2 Ohio Op. 157, 195 N.E. 237
(March 27, 1935).
Subsequent to the principal case, the question was presented for the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the 9 th District, as to the power
of the city councils to repeal ordinances enacted by the councils, which
ordinances had been approved by the people on a referendum vote. Re-
lying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case, the
Court of Appeals held that the councils were possessed of that power.
Francisco v. Cuyahoga Falls, et, 19 Abs. 666 (Decided July 8, 1935).
The people of Ohio have provided for the organization of munici-
palities by the terms of Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of
Ohio, which reads: "The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation of cities, and unincorporated villages, by general laws: * *
In the exercise and performance of this power and duty, the state legis-
lature has delegated to the councils, legislative powers for the self-govern-
ment of municipalities. Ohio G.C. Sec. 42o6 states: "The legislative
power of each city shall be vested in and exercised by a council, * *
Ohio G.C. Sec. 4211 reads: "The powers of council shall be legislative
only, * * *."
Although legislative powers for the government of municipalities
have thus been delegated by the General Assembly to the city councils,
the electorate has reserved legislative powers to itself by virtue of the
provisions of Article II, Section i, f of the Ohio Constitution. That
provision stipulates: "The initiative and referendum powers are hereby
reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such
municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized to control by legisla-
tive action; such powers shall be exercised in the manner now or here-
after provided by law." The General Assembly has authorized munici-
palities to exercise legislative action in regard to the creation and mainte-
nance of municipal fire departments. Ohio G.C. Sec. 4393 provides:
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"The council may establish all necessary regulations to guard against
the occurrence of fire, * * * and for such purpose may establish and
maintain a fire department, * * *."
By the provisions of Ohio G.C. Sec. 4227-1 to 13, the legislature
has stipulated the manner in which the powers of the initiative and refer-
endum are to be exercised. The provisions of these sections have been
limited in application by the terms of Ohio G.C. Sec. 4227-12 to non-
charter cities, or to cities which have a charter but have made no pro-
vision therein regulating the manner in which the powers of the initiative
and referendum are to be exercised. Thus cities having charters may if
the people see fit, adopt their own regulations as part of the charter.
Nowhere in the statutes or Constitution of Ohio is there any express
bestowal of power on city councils to repeal the legislation enacted by
means of initiated ordinances. By the provisions of Article II, Section i-f
of the Ohio Constitution, there is expressly reserved to the people of a
municipality the power to repeal an ordinance which has been passed by
the city council. This reservation of power was intended to operate as a
check on the abuse of powers originally bestowed on city councils.
Judge Day in dissenting from the opinion of the majority of the
court in the principal case stated that, if councils may render null and
void direct legislation of the people by repealing or amending such legis-
lation, the result is that the people, who are the masters, have been
rendered subservient to the will of their agents and servants, the city
councils.
It is true that the people have the power at the municipal elections
to defeat those councilmen who fail to listen to the vox populi, but they
had that power long before the constitutional amendments providing for
the initiative and referendum were adopted. By these amendments the
people proclaimed their desire and intention to provide a further check,
one which was to be more effective and more certain in its operation,
for they had learned that the check provided by the elections at the polls
did not always remedy existing evils. By reason of the fact that the
people reserved to themselves the power to initiate and repeal legislation
in order to protect their interests where legislation by the city councils
failed to attain such purpose, can it not be reasonably inferred by the
reservation of those powers they intended to deprive the city councils of
any power to repeal or amend legislation enacted by means of initiated
ordinances?
Even though a city council may in all honesty deem certain legisla-
tion outmoded and undesirable, where that legislation is the product of
the direct action of the people it should remain as a part of the law until
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such time as the people themselves have seen fit to repeal that law.
Otherwise, a recalcitrant council could thwart the desires of the elec-
torate by repealing an initiated ordinance immediately after its adoption.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in support of its opinion quoted with
approval a statement appearing in the case of Kadderly v. City of Port-
land, 44 Ore. I8, 74 Pac. 710 (1903), which reads: "Statutes pro-
posed and enacted by the people are subject to the same constitutional
limitations as legislative statutes, and after their adoption they exist at
the will of the legislature just as do other laws." This statement was
made by the court in a general discussion of the extent of the power to
legislate by means of the initiative and referendum, and it does not ap-
pear that the decision of the case in any manner rested on the determi-
nation of the question presented by the principal case, nor does it appear
that there was any statutory or constitutional provision granting to the
legislature of Oregon the power to .epeal initiated legislation.
The Supreme Court also quoted from 2 McQuillan on Municipal
Corporations 934, Section 867, as follows: "To render the power of
initiative and referendum effective, the legislative power of the council
is commonly restricted by the provision that no ordinance or amendment
to an ordinance adopted by the electors shall be repealed or amended by
the council, * * *." From the rule as stated by McQuillan, the Supreme
Court infers that the initiated ordinances of a non-charter city may be
repealed by the city council. The author of the text from which this
quotation has been taken cites as authority for the rule which he ex-
presses, the cases of Dallas v. Dallas Consolidated Elec. St. Ry. Co.,
(Tex. Civ. App.), 158 S.-W. 76 (1913); Holland v. Cranfill (Tex.
Civ. App.), 167 S.W. 308 (914); State ex rel. v. MacQueen, 82
W.Va. 44, 99 S.E. 666 (1918). In all of these cases there were
express provisions in the city charters declaring that the city council is
forbidden the right to repeal initiated ordinances. The cases cited do
not involve the question presented by the principal case and are there-
fore no authority for the proposition that in the absence of express pr."-
visions in the city charter, a city council may amend or repeal initiated
ordinances.
The case of Allen v. Hollingsworth, 246 Ky. 812, 56 S.W. (2)
530 (1933), was also cited by the Supreme Court in support of its
decision. Although the Kentucky court in that case made a general
statement in the course of its opinion, which statement supports the rule
sought by the respondents in the principal case, it is submitted that such
statement is purely dictum, for in that case a city charter fixed the
salaries of a city board of commissioners. The court there held that the
6o LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1935
municipality could enact ordinances which violates its charter. The case
in no manner presents the question which has been raised by the principal
case.
The records reveal no cases in which the question was directly pre-
sented to the courts as to the power of city councils of non-charter
cities to repeal initiated ordinances. The fact that many city charters
have provisions relative to the power of council to repeal the direct legis-
lation of the people should bear no weight in the decision of the question
under discussion, for in Ohio by the very statute which gives effect to
the constitutional provision reserving powers of initiative and referendum,
the General Assembly has delegated the power to charter municipalities
to regulate the manner in which such powers of direct legislation are to
be exercised. As to non-charter cities, the statutes of Ohio make no
provision whereby city councils are granted the power to repeal initiated
ordinances, nor are the city councils granted the power to reenact their
own legislation which has been repealed by the people in the exercise of
their rights of the referendum. The constitutional provision which re-
serves to the people the power to legislate by direct action also bestows
on the General Assembly the right to regulate the manner of exercising
those powers. From the mere fact that the legislature has not spoken
in regard to the subject of repealing ordinances which have been initiated
by the people of a non-chafter city, is it reasonable to infer that the people
of Ohio in granting the legislature the right to regulate the manner of
exercising the rights of the initiative thereby granted to their city coun-
cils the power to repeal the legislation which they themselves have en-
acted?
Referring to the power of the legislature or other agent of the people
to enact laws, and to the power of the people to enact legislation directly
by exercising the powers of the initiative, Judge Wilkin in Pfefer v.
Graves, Secy. of State, 88 O.S. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (913), said:
"* * * The first is a delegated power-from the people to their legisla-
tive agents or representatives. The second is a reserved power; it com-
prehends all of the sovereign power of legislation not thus delegated.
Instinctively the legal mind affirms that the delegated power is to be
strictly construed with reference to the purpose for which it was granted.
But on the contrary, the reserved original power is not to be restricted
by any limitations except such as are imbedded in the federal constitu-
tion." The decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case indicates
a departure from the spirit in which the provisions of Article II of the
Ohio Constitution, dealing with the powers of the initiative and refer-
endum, were first construed and interpreted by that court in Pfefer v.
Graves, supra.
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The question raised in the principal case is one of considerable mag-
nitude, and it merits unusual consideration by reason of the fact that it
deals with a constitutional provision which purports to reserve rights and
powers to the people, not as individuals, but as a body politic. The
General Assembly ought to enact legislation at the earliest possible mo-
ment for the purpose of preventing the repeal or modification by the
councils of non-charter cities of initiated ordinances and ordinances ap-
proved by a referendum vote. Such legislation would secure to the
people of non-charter cities the protection which they intended to pro-
vide to themselves when they enacted the constitutional provisions with
regard to the initiative and referendum.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
BAILMENTS-STATUS OF OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE PARKING
LOT-LIABILITY FOR THEFT.
One Sheehan parked his car in defendant's parking lot and received
a parking ticket for which he paid the requisite fee. The ticket dis-
claimed any liability on the part of defendant for theft. The car was
stolen, even though Sheehan had locked it. One of the two attendants
in charge at the time saw the thief driving the car away, but was unable
to overtake him. Plaintiff insurance company, having paid Sheehan for
his loss, seeks to recover the value of the car. The Court of Appeals, in
reversing a judgment of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, held that
defendant, a bailee for hire, was not negligent and therefore not liable
for the theft of the car. One judge dissented. Syndicate Parking, Inc.
v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., et al., 17 Ohio Abs. 596 ('934).
The court, without discussing the point, proceeded upon the as-
sumption that the transaction in question constituted a bailment for hire.
Whether or not there was a bailment depends upon the extent of control
exercised by defendant over the car. Some courts have held that though
a fee is charged, if the owner can remove the car at will, there is
merely a license to park and not such a surrender of control as to con-
stitute a bailment. Lord v. Okla. State Fair dss'n., 95 Okla. 294, 219
Pac. 713 (1923); Thompson v. Mobile Light and Railway Co., 211
Ala. 525, 101 So. 177, 34 A.L.R. 921 (1924); and see Suits v. Elec-
tric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275 (1923). In none of
these cases was there any condition precedent to the owner's right to
possession. But where a condition precedent, such as the presentation
